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LITTORAL RIGHTS UNDER
THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE:
THE CLASH BETWEEN THE IUS
NATURALE AND STOP THE BEACH
RENOURISHMENT
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

*

The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
1
Environmental Protection bristles with conceptual difficulties and
practical ambiguities that cannot be easily avoided or easily answered.
The major conceptual issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment is
whether the Supreme Court should recognize “judicial takings” under
the Takings Clause, which reads: “[N]or shall private property be
2
taken for public use, without just compensation.” The textual claim
for recognizing judicial takings is that the Takings Clause does not
differentiate between various branches of government and thus
covers the actions of the judiciary as well as those of the legislative
3
and executive branches.
Opponents of this doctrine often deride it as a constitutional
oxymoron. By definition, state courts cannot take the very property
rights that their former decisions have established. Given that this
tension exists within any unitary judicial system, the doctrine of
judicial takings can, in practice, only arise in a federalist system. At
*

Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; the Peter and
Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and Senior Lecturer, The University of
Chicago. This paper was prepared for a conference on Stop the Beach Renourishment to be held
at Duke University School of Law on February 4, 2011, and to be published in the Duke Journal
of Constitutional Law & Public Policy. My thanks to Brett Davenport and Christopher Tan,
NYU Law School Class of 2012, for their usual expert research assistance.
1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. For a defense of this view, see Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the
Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 94–96 (2011).
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the state level, there is no reason to expect that any state court will
strike down the common-law rights that it has just announced. Even if
a court disagreed with its past decisions, the more modest way to
approach the problem is to overturn the prior law as part of the
4
evolution of common-law rights. Similarly, in the highly restrictive
5
domain of federal common law, the Supreme Court cannot be
expected to invalidate its judicial decisions under the Takings Clause.
The problem, therefore, can only arise in practice as it did in Stop the
Beach Renourishment—in a federal system, when a federal court
invalidates the decision of the state supreme court, which is therefore
rendered less than supreme in the articulation of its own doctrine. To
many, this kind of interaction represents the antithesis to the divided
6
system of rights under our federalist system.
Notwithstanding these powerful objections, there is a sensible,
albeit restricted, place for the doctrine of judicial takings under
federal constitutional law. That approach makes little sense when
property rights in a positivist tradition are thought to be
manifestations of state power. It has far more attraction, however,
within the natural law system, in which judges are rightly seen as
custodians of a customary system of property rights that were created
by common practice long before there were any courts to enforce the
rules in question. Those conditions hold, as I shall show, in connection
7
with water law where the so-called ius naturale was regarded by all
courts as the traditional lodestone by which these questions were
8
measured. Under that view, it is wrong to think of water law as if it
were “judge-made” law when, historically, it was derived from a
system of decentralized customary law whose basic norms had been
firmly entrenched long before the appearance of a centralized judicial
system.
It is therefore appropriate to hold courts responsible for keeping
to the main contours of water law in making their judicial decisions.
Stop the Beach Renourishment thus offered a much needed way to
4. For stress on this theme, see Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and
Collateral Attack on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107,
107–08 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (holding that
“[t]he rights and duties of the United States . . . are governed by federal rather than local law”).
6. See Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 108–10.
7. See infra Part III.
8. Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water,
LINCOLN INSTITUTE (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1719688 [hereinafter Epstein, Playing by Different Rules].
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address the actions of state courts whose decisions have strayed too
far—and for no good reason—from these customary standards.
Ironically, the difficulties in Stop the Beach Renourishment did not lie
with the particulars of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act
9
(Preservation Act), which represents a surprisingly sensible
environmental scheme. Instead, the target of judicial wrath should
have been Florida’s earlier case law that twisted every known
principle of water law by treating man-made diversions from a lake or
a river as though they were “avulsions,” or major natural events that
10
alter the flow of water without any human intervention. Put simply,
the polar opposites in any system of tortious responsibility for
individual action are acts of God and deliberate creations of harm by
an individual. In a remarkable tour-de-force, Justice Scalia’s analysis
of Florida’s statutory scheme failed to distinguish between these two
kinds of acts. The weakness in his decision, consequently, did not
relate to his general analysis of judicial takings, but to his uncritical
11
treatment of the Florida case of Martin v. Busch (which authorized
the uncompensated diversion) as the legitimate starting point for the
analysis, instead of treating that decision as the proper object of wrath
in any judicial takings analysis. Once the law of littoral rights is
correctly sorted out, the Preservation Act should be regarded,
presumptively, as a taking of littoral rights. But these takings may not
require any explicit cash compensation because the key provisions of
the Preservation Act may provide full in-kind compensation in three
separate forms: the protection of the beach on the landward side of
the wall, the creation of the view easement, and the creation of the
access easement, which together could easily exceed the value of any
possible accretions on the seaward side of the wall.
In order to make out this case, I shall proceed as follows. In Part I,
I shall outline the general features of Florida’s water law both before
and after passage of the Preservation Act. In Part II, I shall put the
rules of property law in context, dealing in turn with land, water, and
the beach that lies between them as a matter of both common and
customary law. In Part III, I shall examine the role of the ius naturale
(the natural law) in the origin and formation of property law, under
both the common and Roman law systems. In that section, I shall
outline the historical distinction between alluvion, or gradual changes,
9. 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246, amended by, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.45 (2007).
10. For discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
11. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927).
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and avulsion, or radical changes, and explain the strong efficiency
characteristics of the classical rules as they apply to property owners
of both riparian and littoral interests. In part IV, I turn to the question
of judicial takings and defend that doctrine in order to explore how
the basic rules were misapplied in connection with the Florida
statutory scheme. In part V, I turn to the larger question of when the
doctrine of judicial takings should be applied in other cases and
conclude that its application should be limited to those circumstances
in which the decided cases make a radical break from well-established
common-law patterns that systematically work for the advantage of
the state or some identifiable private faction. A short conclusion
speculates on the reasons for the abject breakdown of private law
conceptions of property rights in the Supreme Court.
I. THE SHAPE OF FLORIDA LAW
Traditionally, Florida law distinguishes between riparian rights,
which govern those who own land adjacent to a river, and littoral
rights, which govern those who own land bordering a lake or an
12
ocean. In general, both types of rights are generally established as a
matter of common law—a proposition that is quickly freighted with
much meaning. The littoral rights at issue in Stop the Beach
Renourishment include the ability of individuals to gain access to the
beach from their own property and to have the right of an
13
unobstructed view over the beach to the water beyond. That
delineation of rights necessarily limits the rights of the public and the
state over the beach. As a common-law matter, neither the state nor
any private party could build along the beach a wall that blocked off
14
access to the water from abutting landowners. The situation only
becomes more complicated because the interface between public and
private rights necessarily varies as the beach itself moves in response
to all sorts of natural elements. Left to its own devices, nature can
wipe out some littoral property if the water level rises, or it can lead
to a major expansion of beachfront property if the water level falls, so
12. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2598 n.1 (2010) (“Many cases and statutes use ‘riparian’ to mean abutting any body of water.
The Florida Supreme Court, however, has adopted a more precise usage whereby ‘riparian’
means abutting a river or stream and ‘littoral’ means abutting an ocean, sea, or lake.”).
13. See id. at 2600 (“. . . (1) the right to receive accretions to their property; and (2) the
right to have the contact of their property with the water remain intact.”).
14. See id. at 2594 (“Littoral land owners have, inter alia, rights to have access to the water .
. . .”).
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that more land becomes fit for vegetation and other forms of use.
The movement of the beach is necessarily a source of uncertainty
for the people who own adjacent property, and the question is what, if
anything, the state should do to eliminate that uncertainty and the
reduction in land value that it normally generates. In Florida’s case,
15
the solution was to pass the Preservation Act, the purpose of which
was to fight nature and to stabilize the beachfront by adding sand and
other support to the beach to prevent erosion. In effect, the statutory
scheme established an “erosion control line” at the point where the
16
private upland became a public beach. It then took efforts on the
seaward side of that line to shore up the beach, while taking steps to
preserve the littoral owner’s access to the beach and views of the
17
ocean. The decision to construct the needed barriers was, of
necessity, a collective one because the investments in these erosioncontrol devices will work only if done on sections of the beach that
are more extensive than the boundary lines of each individual plot of
land. On beachfront sites, these lots tend to be narrow and deep in
order to maximize the two elements of value that the Preservation
Act strove to preserve. The collective good that is provided by erosion
control, however, might not have equal value for all beach owners,
some of whom may prefer to take the risk of erosion in order to
preserve the option to acquire new lands as the beach goes out to
18
sea.
The constitutional challenges presented by the scheme of
beachfront control are profound because they involve the intersection
of two separate tasks. The first is to get a clear grasp of the property
rights regime that operated in Florida prior to the advent of the
19
Preservation Act. These rights were, for the most part, not defined by
statute but by some system of common-law adjudication, the status of
which is always hard to pin down. Stop the Beach Renourishment
therefore spent a good deal of time sorting out the set of property
rights to which the Takings Clause applied. That task is no mean feat
given that the beach lies at the intersection of land and water, which
are subject to radically different property rights regimes. The
touchstone for the former tends to be exclusive rights in single

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246, amended by, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.45 (2007).
See FLA. STAT. § 161.191; see also § 161.151(3) (defining “erosion control line”).
See FLA. STAT. § 161.141.
For discussion of the valuation questions, see infra Part IV.B.
FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.45 (2007).

DO NOT DELETE

42

6/21/2011 12:25:40 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 6:1

persons, while the touchstone for the latter is common and shared
20
rights by large (and often different) groups of individuals. Only if
these common-law property rights have constitutional status does the
takings inquiry make sense. If littoral rights were just a creature of the
state, such that they could be created or cancelled at will, then the
entire structure of littoral rights, indeed all property rights, would
21
come tumbling down. No longer would the function of the state be
to preserve and defend an independent set of property rights. Instead,
it could create or displace any system of entitlements, whether on land
or water, by a simple assertion of collective political will, thereby
undermining one of the central features of any sound system of
22
rights—the stability of expectations.
Once the definition of littoral rights is fixed, the next question is
how the federal constitutional protection should apply to this form of
private property. This inquiry is not one-dimensional and is typically
understood in connection with other forms of government action,
23
both federal and state, to involve at least four interlocking inquiries.
First, whether the state action has taken private property in light of
the difficulty of defining beachfront rights to begin with. Second,
whether that taking is for a public use. Third, whether just
compensation has been provided for the property so taken. And
fourth, whether there is some police power justification that allows
the state to regulate without the payment of compensation. Justice
Scalia thought that the entire case could be disposed of by accepting
24
two related propositions, which had a Job-like quality. In his view,

20. For a discussion of these points, see Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra note 8.
For a comprehensive overview of the Roman and English origins of water law, see JOSHUA
GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW (2006).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973) (holding that the government
did not owe compensation for grazing rights appurtenant to private land subject to
condemnation when these rights were cancellable at will without cause). This issue is quite
different from those raised in the companion case of Almota Farmers Elev. & Whse. Co. v.
United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973), in which the government owed compensation to a tenant
whose improvements had value after the expiration of the current term of the lease. The
interference with advantageous relations caused a loss of those residual values. It is one thing
for the government to exercise its own right to terminate a relationship. It is quite another thing
for it to disrupt the valuable relationships between two private parties and offer only meager
compensation at best.
22. See Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra note 8, at 6–10 (discussing the status of
collective property rights).
23. For an extended treatment of this issue, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS] (developing
the comprehensive four-part test referred to in the text).
24. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2595
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the law gaveth by insisting that the Constitution applies to takings by
the judiciary as much as it applies to takings by the legislature or the
25
executive. But thereafter, the law tooketh away when the supposed
“avulsive” conduct of the state did not take away any rights that were
part of the package of littoral rights involved in this case. I agree with
him on the first point, but think that his analysis of both the
underlying property rights and the Takings Clause is incorrect. Quite
simply, in his view, the proposed state action was not a taking at all
insofar as it did not interfere with prior expectations, so that there
26
were no property rights to which the Takings Clause could attach. I
do not think the Florida cases that he cites are sufficient to support
that contention, and believe that property rights were indeed taken.
Because the Florida scheme, unlike so many others, supplies return
compensation in the form of both erosion protection and the
preservation of view and access, it is an open question of fact, best
resolved on remand, as to whether the bundle of rights supplied is
equal to or greater in value than the access and view rights that were
27
disrupted by the Preservation Act.
II: THE PROPERTY LAW CONTEXT
A. Land, Water, and Beaches
It is well understood that two major branches of property law deal
with water and land and that these areas of law are governed by quite
different principles. The gist of the distinction is that property rights in
land start with the notion of a relatively coherent body of rights in a
determinate thing, which can be measured in three dimensions: space,
time, and incidents of ownership. The first of these is space. The
general view follows the Roman maxim, cuius est solum eius est usque
28
ad coelum usque ad inferos, such that whosoever owns land owns
from the heavens above to the depths of the earth below. Under that
view, all air and mineral rights belong to the surface owner, who can
use or dispose of them as he sees fit. Next, property must be
organized along the dimension of time. In addition to the fee simple,

(2010).
25. See id. at 2601 (“The Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific
branch or branches.”).
26. See id. at 2615.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. Meaning, “for whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell.”
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property can be divided into life estates and remainders, so that
different people can hold sequential interests in the same asset at
29
different pre-appointed times. And finally, property in land can be
divided by the incidents of ownership, including possession, use, and
disposition. The strong consensus with respect to property in land is to
favor a set of exclusive rights so that a single owner is in a position to
30
deal with the property to the exclusion of everyone else. This basic
position is qualified in a number of ways, but these modifications, with
reciprocal easements between neighbors, are sufficiently limited so
31
that they do not undermine the basic overall conception.
Property rights in water start from the opposite direction.
Whether we think of rivers and streams on the one hand or lakes and
oceans on the other, property rights tend to be held in common so
that large numbers of individuals have access to a body of water in
32
different ways, but over which no one person has exclusive rights.
Quite simply, the property arrangements that are most conducive to
the efficient use of land are wholly inappropriate for water. At the
same time, however, the complexity of water rights is such that no
single system of shared or common use makes sense for all the places
in which water is used. Variation across systems is a given and it is
these differences that have to be accommodated in connection with
the constitutional protection of property rights. In this regard, the
received wisdom is that the state defines the rights that the Takings
Clause then protects under a set of constitutional tests and standards
33
that are decidedly a matter of federal common law.
The beach, of course, lies at the crossroads between land and
water. In most cases, the size of a beach tends to be relatively

29. For the standard account of future interests, see THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G.
HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS (1984); for its evolution,
see A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW (2d ed. 1986).
30. As in Blackstone’s oft-stated dictum of real property: “That sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of
the right of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*2, discussed in Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra note 8, at 51–52. For the
overemphasis of exclusivity in the bundle of rights, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164 (1979), and also, Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730 (1998).
31. For a discussion of implicit in-kind compensation in this connection, see TAKINGS,
supra note 23.
32. For the relationship between private and common property, see Richard A. Epstein,
On the Optimal Mix of Common and Private Property, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 17 (1994).
33. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2597 (2010).
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constant, but its location can shift back and forth as a result of
climatic changes, both large and small. The basic logic of beach
formation is easy enough to understand. Water runs back and forth
over land. On the ocean, the beach is extensive in low tide and is far
less so in high tide. As the water rushes back and forth, no vegetation
can take root, so the beach is sand and rock. But, the vegetation
creeps down to the high-water line. If some exogenous shock pushes
the water higher up, the vegetation dies and a new beach establishes
itself. If the water level drops, the vegetation pushes outward and the
beach retreats seaward. With rivers and lakes the mechanism for
movement of the banks or beach could be somewhat different. It is
quite easy to see how the changes from the spring melt to the summer
drought can change the size of a river, and how the constant forces of
nature can easily change the direction of its flow. The boundaries of
beachfront property therefore raise profound issues that do not arise
with respect to most plots of land.
B. Customary Rights and Common Law
The key challenge to state property law is to find a set of
mechanisms to mediate the different regimes for land and water that
come together on the beach. These problems are very old and the
solutions to them were customary long before any state legislature
could address the matter at hand. The practices involved, though,
were not local customs, which necessarily vary from place to place to
fit Blackstone’s definition of “particular customs, or laws, which affect
34
only the inhabitants of particular districts.” These local customs are
of immense importance. Their distinctive features, however, often
present serious problems of proof, which are discussed at length in
35
David Bederman’s excellent article on the subject. It was well
understood that these particular customs could vary freely across
36
districts, without any evident rhyme or reason.
Those local customary rights, however, are not what are referred
to in dealing with the general rules that govern the intersection of
public and private rights at the beach. The principles involved in

34. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *74.
35. David Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996).
36. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34 (“[P]articular counties, cities, towns, manors, and
lordships were very early indulged with the privilege of abiding by their own customs, in
contradistinction to the rest of the nation at large.”).
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dealing with these nationwide or universal practices were far broader
and did not depend on specific proof of particular practices, over a
long period of time, in a given locale, by a specific set of persons. In
dealing with these practices, Blackstone looked to “general customs;
37
which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom,” for which no
individualized proof of custom was required.
There is a substantial glitch, however, in this effort to paint a
seamless web between local customs and the common law, which did
not pass unnoticed. Judge Buller wrote: “How that which may be
claimed by all the inhabitants of England can be the subject of a
custom, I cannot conceive. Customs must in their nature be confined
to individuals of a particular description, and what is common to all
38
mankind, can never be claimed as a custom.” The key question is
whether it is possible in principle to overcome that perceived gap. The
task is not easy. With respect to particular customs, virtually every
case requires particular proof of the practice dating back a long time,
which often enmeshes a case in such difficult issues as to the
geographical extent of the supposed custom, the individuals who are
bound and benefited by it, and the countless issues of dedication and
39
prescription. Answering these questions requires a court to establish
appropriate burdens of proof on each of these matters of material
fact. The general common law labors under none of these limitations.
Any custom that is universal does not have any limited geographical
extent, but applies anywhere and everywhere. Since it is said to be
universal, there is no need to find some magic start date by which
time the custom must have been solidified. The clear implication is
that cut-offs of this variety no longer matter.

37. Id. at 66.
38. Fitch v. Rawling, 2 H. Bl. 393, 398, 126 Eng. Rep. 614, 617–18 (C.P. 1795) (Buller, J.),
discussed in Bederman, supra note 35. Bederman also cites Earl of Coventry v. Willes, 12 W.R.
127, 128 (Q.B. 1863), which asserted a custom that the public was entitled to view a horse race
from its perch on a private manor. The ground given to reject that claim was that “the rights
possessed by the Queen’s subjects generally are part of the general law of the land, and not the
customs of a particular place.” The truth, however, is that even if one treated, in line with
Blackstone’s remark, the common law as a supercustom, this claim was in its very formation so
particularistic that it would have to be rejected on its individual merits in the absence of any per
se rule.
39. See Bederman, supra note 35, at 1414. Prescription usually refers to situations where a
particular individual obtains some easement over the land of another. Dedication usually refers
to the situation where the public at large gains a similar right. With easements, the various
elements of continuous and open use have to be satisfied by one person. With dedication, the
public is a shifting group of individuals, so that extensive use by a fluctuating class of individuals
allows the benefits to go to members of the public who have never entered the property at all.
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Yet, there has to be a flip side to the problem. The requirements
for proving a local custom are onerous, which makes sense given the
observable variations at that level. But there is no reason to impose
similarly strict requirements on universal customs, whose powerful
common features generate a dominant solution that, as an empirical
matter, no one is really prepared to contest. The durability of the
practice is its strongest calling card. If everyone does it this way, why
quarrel even if you do not understand how the common practice is
put together? To the modern functionalist mind, this slavish devotion
to tradition is, if anything, a source of condemnation. But for most
traditional writers, the reference to universal custom slipped
imperceptibly into another mode of address that seems archaic and
stilted to the modern era. The broad notion of universal practice is
treated as part of the ius naturale, or those rights given and defined in
accordance with nature. This natural law strand makes no appearance
whatsoever in any of the opinions of the Supreme Court in Stop The
40
Beach Renourishment, which is itself quiet testimony to the extent
that the natural law thinking of earlier ages has fallen into disrepute.
III: PROPERTY AND THE IUS NATURALE
Historically, matters were quite different from the way that they
appeared to the Supreme Court. There is little doubt that the entire
body of law that related to the intersection of land and water was
41
treated as part of the ius naturale. The centrality of this concept is
evident from the opening passages in both Gaius’s and Justinian’s
Institutes, which pick up on the same theme. Thus, for Gaius, the lay of
the land is set out in the opening passage of his Institutes:
All peoples who are ruled by laws and customs partly make use of
their own ius, and partly have recourse to those which are common
to all men; for what every people establishes as ius is their own
and is called the ius civile, just as the ius of their own city; and
what natural reason establishes among all men and is observed by
all peoples alike, is called the ius gentium, as being the ius which
all nations employ. Therefore the Roman people partly make use
of their own ius, and partly avail themselves of that common to all
men, which matters we shall explain separately in their proper

40. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
41. See GETZLER, supra note 20, at 65–71, 129–40 (describing Roman law and the
“substantive nature of water rights” and the “triumph of natural-right analysis” in riparian
doctrine respectively).
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place.

In dealing with this passage, it is important to note several points.
The first is the appeal to natural reason—although naturalis ratio is
better translated as the reason of nature—which suggests that a
transcendent justification for law does not depend on the vagaries of
local customs. Cognitive skills and deductive argument seem to
suffice. It is equally important to note that, by referring to reason, the
natural lawyers denied that these rules were established in an
arbitrary fashion by judicial decisions. Instead, they were thought to
be the result of a process of reason that allows these rules to be
43
“common to all men.” On this view of the world, general reason, not
the peculiar dictates of the Florida Supreme Court, is the source of
law. Thus, the reason of nature should instruct the Florida Supreme
Court on how to deal with these issues.
Accepting this view of the subject, as it was surely accepted at the
44
time of the Founding, Justice Scalia cannot just dismiss the claims for
compensation raised in Stop the Beach Renourishment solely on the
ground that the Florida cases (which he over-reads in any event) are
dispositive to the problem at hand. Indeed, the very treatises to which
he refers stress time and again that the rules with respect to alluvion
and avulsion are governed by the natural law and not by any form of
45
local custom. The 1904 Farnham treatise, for example, contains
42. G. INST. 1.1. The parallel passages in Justinian are found in J. INST. 1.2.1. The Latin for
the law of nations is ius gentium, and for law the Latin is ius. Thus, the Latin of the quoted
passage reads:
[I. De iure civili et naturali.] 1. Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo
proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur: Nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi
ius constituit, id ipsius proprium est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium civitatis; quod vero
naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur
vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. Populus itaque Romanus partim
suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur. Quae singula qualia sint, suis locis
proponemus.
43. See G. INST. I.1.
44. The tradition is most evident in the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Self-evidence is yet
another variation on universal custom. Note that natural rights play little role in the United
States Constitution, which is a compact between states, but the logic was evident in state
constitutions of the time. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. I (“All men are born free and
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”).
45. See HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 324 (1904)
(“When it is determined that a separate parcel of land is accretion or alluvion, it is the property
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references to rights that are jure naturae, by the right of nature. “The
right to future alluvial formation or batture is a vested right, inherent
in the property itself, and forming an essential attribute of it, resulting
47
from natural law in consequence of the local situation of the land.”
Elsewhere, that same treatise says, in criticism of some state-law cases,
that “the stream is created by nature, and man has no right to destroy
48
it.” Instructively, that treatise also states that the state has never
attempted to avoid its obligation to provide compensation when it so
interfered with water rights “to dispose of the land in front of its
grantees of shore land because ‘the attempt to make such grants is
calculated to render titles uncertain, and derogate from the value of
49
natural boundaries, like streams and bodies of water.’” The appeal to
natural law was likewise made in Lewis’s treatise, where he quotes at
length from the decision of the House of Lords on the question of
“whether a riparian proprietor on the banks of a tidal navigable river
had any rights or natural easements similar to those which belong to a
50
riparian proprietor upon a non-tidal stream.” In ways that differ
from the modern American law on the navigation servitude, that
question was answered in the affirmative so that the riparian rights
survived. The Lord Selborne squarely rested his decision on natural
law by noting that “[t]he rights of a riparian proprietor, so far as they
relate to any natural stream, exist jurae naturae, because his land has,
51
by nature, the advantage of being washed by the stream . . . .”
This extensive reliance on the natural law dates back to Roman
times, where the laws of alluvion and avulsion were part of the natural
law as defined by Gaius and Justinian in their respective Institutes.
These classical texts, moreover, do not at any point treat these forms
of property as though they are owned by the state. Rather the term is
that they are “public,” which refers to a system that guarantees all
persons open access, not to a system of state-owned properties like
52
public buildings and amphitheaters. In this regard, it is instructive to
of the owner of the bank to which it forms, the same as though it had always existed there. This
is the rule recognized by the law of nations.”).
46. Id. at 111, 280, 294.
47. Id. at 330 n.8. Batture refers to “deposits along the shore of the Mississippi river.” Id. at
330.
48. Id. at 613.
49. Id. at 316 (quoting Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891)).
50. JOHN LEWIS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 89 (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1888).
51. Id. at 90 (quoting Lyon v. Fishmongers Co., 1 App. Cas. 662, 682 (1876)).
52. For the difference, see J. INST. 2.1.1–3, contrasting the sea and the shore, which are
open to all, with those things that are said to belong to the corporate body, like theaters and
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quote from Gaius to see how the matter was perceived.
(70) Land acquired by us through alluvion also becomes ours
under the same law. This is held to take place when a river, by
degrees, makes additions of soil to our land in such a way that we
cannot estimate the amount added at any one moment of time;
and this is what is commonly stated to be an addition made by
53
alluvion, which is added so gradually as to escape our sight.
(71) Therefore, if the river should carry away a part of your land
54
and bring it to mine, that part will still continue to be yours.
(72) But, if an island rises in the middle of a river, it is the common
property of those who possess land on both sides of the stream; but
if it is not in the middle of the river, it will belong to those who
55
have land on the nearest bank of the stream.

There is a lot that can be learned from these simple passages. Let
us start with alluvion, move on to occupatio and accessio, and then
turn to avulsion, which is only addressed in Justinian, who found
(correctly) that Gaius was incomplete on this point.
A. Alluvion
First, in the key passage, “the same law” refers to the law of
nature, which Gaius had elaborated on in preceding sections of his
Institutes that were devoted to showing how the natural laws on
occupation allowed individuals to take title to land, wild animals, and
chattels, each with its own peculiar variations, based of course on the
56
nature of the type of property acquired. Since these rules are part of
the law of nature, there is no mention here of any particular source of
law or any particular custom that creates the rights in question. There
is, however, the clear implication that the rules are followed by just
about everyone, so that one test of their rationality is their
commonality and durability. It is not a formal justification of why the
rules make sense, but an instructive test that can be applied to
indicate that they do work well. The constant shift between natural
reason and rules common to all men makes sense.
racecourses. The key point is that rights of exclusion make perfectly good sense for the latter,
where the rights to exclude are functional, but they make no sense with the former.
53. G. INST. 2.70.
54. Id. at 2.71.
55. Id. at 2.72.
56. See id. at 2.66–69 (describing property rules over animals and land). For the parallel
passages in Justinian, see J. INST. 2.2.1–19.
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This is doubly true in this context because, with respect to the
natural modes for the acquisition of property, no formal devices (such
as the Roman mancipatio—a formal conveyance obsolete by the time
57
of Justinian) are needed to explain how title is obtained. The want of
formality is what tends to distinguish the natural law from the civil
law. Thus, the natural law will posit marriage as a natural relationship,
but then leave the ceremonies for marriage to the civil law. Similar
rules apply with respect to contracts and conveyance. There is,
accordingly, far less reason to expect any local variation in the natural
modes of acquisition.
Second, Gaius explains that the rules on alluvion apply to those
incremental adjustments to ownership that are too small to “estimate”
58
at any point in time. He offers no systematic argument on behalf of
that critical proposition. Rather, in line with the work by most natural
law theorists, both he and Justinian tend to rely on dogmatic
assertions of the way things are without offering any detailed
59
explanation of why they remain that way. It does not follow,
however, that we cannot find any explanation for the rules in question
that makes sense, in our time as well as in theirs.
With respect to alluvion, the explanations draw from a useful mix
of common sense and basic economic theory. On the former issue,
boundary disputes in ancient times were, if anything, far more
important than they are today, where it is possible to describe land by
metes and bounds and to protect any land title by state action. The
easiest way to define boundaries is to say that “my plot runs down to
the river,” which is just the way that everyone, everywhere, describes
the situation in ordinary speech. Hence, it is easy to see the customary
ways in which the norm was established.
That everyday statement also contains the seeds of profound
economic wisdom. As a practical matter, that sentence should not be
rendered false if the river bank itself moves by small increments that
can barely be observed. It adds to the stability of possession that these
random perturbations of a given equilibrium point do nothing to alter
the ownership of the land. The opposite position could easily result in
having the same point on the earth’s surface count as the boundary
line between two riparians even if it moves to the middle of the river.
57. For a description of how mancipatio worked, see G. INST. 1.119. These rules also
applied for the conveyance of land, slaves, and certain herd animals. Id. at 1.120.
58. G. INST. 2.70.
59. See, e.g., G. INST. 2.70–78; J. INST. 2.1.20–25.
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The constant geographical position could separate the former riparian
from the river by a sliver of land too small to be viable economically.
Clearly, two riparians are better than one, or perhaps even none. This
is not one of those situations where fine calipers are needed to
measure the gains or losses from choosing the right rule for a
situation that is defined by topology, not politics. The alluvion rule is
universal precisely because of the winning combination of sensible
property rights and low administrative costs.
B. Occupatio and Accessio
The Roman law of occupatio involves the natural modes of
acquisition of things that were previously unowned. The law of
accessio arises when two things owned by separate individuals are to
some extent combined into a single whole, which thereafter gives rise
to the question of whether to undo the union, divide the ownership, or
60
pay compensation to one side for the loss of its rights. Those rules do
not work well with respect to an island that arises in the middle of the
stream, belonging to either or both riparians depending on its exact
location. The key point is not how those disputes are likely to be
resolved. Rather, it is that the creation of the new land does not create
any claim for the “state,” which is nowhere mentioned in this account
of how ownership rights are assigned. Essentially, it gets rid of the rule
of first possession that normally applies to unoccupied land and limits
the universe of potential takers for the land to the riparians on both
sides of the river, conceivably more than one on each side.
Clearly these rules have to be modified to some extent to deal
with littoral lands, where there is only one shore and not two banks.
The modifications in question, however, should not go to the question
of incremental changes by the beach because the same considerations
at work in the riparian context carry over with equal force in this
context. Access to the ocean is the critical variable and there is no
reason for it to be disturbed by these incremental movements in the
shore. To be sure, these are often more extreme in many locations
than are movements in the banks of the river, but the size of the
variance does not look to be the decisive feature, except to this extent:
If the movement of the ocean boundary is so extreme that an entire
plot of land is wiped out, the abutting land now becomes riparian
60. For the basic rules, see BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW
(1976); for the explanation of how and why these works work, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 67–70 (1995).
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land, subject to the same rules on alluvion. If the land that washed
away is somehow magically restored in anything like its original form
within a short period of time, the new littoral owner could perhaps be
demoted again to inland status. A question of this sort, however, is not
likely to generate anything close to the same consensus as the original
basic rule that allows a riparian or littoral owner to maintain his
access to a river or lake in the face of any small fluctuations of the
location of the river, stream, ocean, or lake.
The position of riparian and littoral owners also differs with
respect to the case of new land. For littoral owners, new land could
arise at an extensive distance from the shore, so that recognizing the
littoral owner’s presumptive claim to that distant land seems far
weaker than the comparable claims of riparians for an island that
emerges in the middle of the river. In light of these physical realities,
the rule changes such that the ownership of the island, according to
61
Justinian, belongs to the first party to occupy the land. But he does
not follow the general rules governing ownership of land islands that
lie within rivers, which is, as he notes, the much more common
62
occurrence. In these cases, there is little benefit from letting a third
party gain access to small slivers of property that are more efficiently
divided between the two riparian owners. One vital point, however, is
the common feature of both these rules. The state does not enjoy any
greater rights in the littoral context than it does in the riparian one.
Any new island is fair game for any taker. It does not in any way,
shape, or form become the property of the state. Nor need it, because
the first possession rule does not require any state office for its
implementation, in sharp contrast to a land or patent registry, which is
necessarily a creature of the state.
Thus far I have not discussed the short passage in Gaius’s
Institutes, Book II, Section 71, which deals with land that has been
63
dislocated from its original perch and carried downstream. That
61. J. INST. 2.1.22.
62. Id. (“When an island is formed in the sea, which rarely happens, it is the property of the
first occupant; for before occupation, it belongs to no one. But when an island is formed in a
river, which frequently happens, if it is placed in the middle of it, it belongs in common to those
who possess the lands near the banks on each side of the river, in proportion to the extent of
each man’s estate adjoining the banks. But, if the island is nearer to one side than the other, it
belongs to those persons only who possess lands contiguous to the bank on that side. If a river
divides itself and afterwards unites again, thus giving to any one’s land the form of an island, the
land still continues to belong to the person to whom it belonged before.”). Note that Justinian
offers the correct solution to the problem of the divided river.
63. G. INST. 2.71.
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passage is clarified by the slightly longer discussion in Justinian, which
notes that the removed soil remains the property of its original owner
so long as it is in a free (i.e., unattached) state. Quite simply, the
Roman rules (and ours) do not think that the movement of one thing
onto the land of another by natural forces is sufficient to transfer
ownership. Usually, a voluntary transaction is required. Thus, no one
would think that a roof uprooted by a storm would become the
property of the person on whose land it eventually landed. That roof
would remain the property of the owner, who might be required to
bear the costs of its removal if he wished to reclaim ownership. The
distinctive feature with respect to land is that the rules on ownership
change when it is no longer possible to simply return the thing to its
64
original owner. Thus, Justinian provides that “[i]f, however, it remains
for long united to your neighbor’s land, and the trees, which it swept
away with it, take root in his ground, these trees from that time
65
become part of your neighbor’s estate.”
This rule makes eminently good sense for two reasons. First, the
process of taking root is not instantaneous, such that once the trees
take root it is quite sensible to apply some inchoate notion of an
individual waiver or statute of limitation to bar the action for return.
Second, the return of the property makes no sense because it would
necessarily result in a diminution of property value, which, from an ex
ante perspective, does not work to the advantage of any riparian. To
be sure, it might well be possible to introduce some notion of
compensation for the additional land, but that would be exceedingly
difficult to determine. In addition, compensation would not serve any
useful social function in this context. The land in question was taken
by forces of nature, so that these cases do not raise the serious moral
hazard associated with the taking of land (for public purposes, we
hope) by government parties. In those circumstances, an explicit price
mechanism via a just compensation requirement makes perfectly
good sense as a constraint on government appetites to acquire land
64. Id.
65. J. INST. 2.1.21. The parallel to the rules of accessio, which govern the combination of
one thing out of the inputs of two people, cannot be overlooked. See G. INST. 2.72–79 (treating
these natural modes of acquisition just after the discussion of riparian rights); see also J. INST.
2.1.25–34, (treating natural modes of acquisition just after the discussion of riparian rights).
Note that in Gaius, the discussion of natural modes of acquisition takes place after the
discussion of the formal modes of conveyancing, which to the modern mind is out of
chronological sequence since acquisition normally precedes transfer. The order is reversed,
surely consciously, in Justinian because the abolition of mancipatio made it easier to take the
two topics in their natural sequence.
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for public projects. In these cases, however, the land movement is
done by no human agency, so that the simple prompt request to allow
for the return of the detached bit of land is sufficient to deal with any
potential source of individual misconduct.
C. Avulsion
The situation once again shifts with avulsion. In the case of rivers,
the rapid shift in location is not amenable to the solution that is used
in the alluvion cases. The extent of the shift is not possible to calculate
in the land and could easily cover extensive territory, so that the new
course of the river runs through the land of individuals who were not
riparians when the river was on its previous course. In these cases, the
only sensible rule is the one adopted by Justinian:
23. If a river, entirely forsaking its natural channel, begins to flow
in another direction, the old bed of the river belongs to those who
possess the lands adjoining its banks, in proportion to the extent
that their respective estates adjoin the banks. The new bed follows
the condition of the river, that is, it becomes public. And, if, after
some time, the river returns to its former channel, the new bed
again becomes the property of those who possess the lands
66
contiguous to its banks.

Once again, Justinian gets it exactly right. It is pointless to think
that the old riparians could claim that status with respect to lands that
they never owned. Hence, the sensible solution is to treat, by
operation of law, the new set of riparians as owners of the land as it
runs down its new course. The abandonment of the old riverbed then
raises the question of ownership, and here the Romans took the
correct position that the land was divided between the two adjacent
67
parties. In taking that view they necessarily rejected the view that
the newly dried land could be taken by the first possessor. Smart.
What possible use is there in a long thin strip of land under separate
ownership? The automatic rule leads to reduced uncertainty and
cleaner property lines. By taking this position, Justinian necessarily
rejected, yet again, the view that the state could make any special
claim to this property, especially because the rules were developed
before the advent of the state.

66. J. INST. 2.1.23.
67. See id.
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D. Littoral Rights
The same problem cannot arise for littoral rights, but variations on
the theme can. For example, if a violent storm cuts off some portion of
an owner’s land from the remainder, there is no reason why he should
not continue to own what he did before, while the new channel is
public water just as it would have been if nothing were there.
Likewise, if the waters inundate the land so that it disappears under
public waters, the land is lost to its original owners. In dealing with the
problem of inundation from rivers, Justinian again takes the correct
position that once the waters retreat into the natural channel, the land
reverts to its original owner. The solution is less clear when the oceans
or lake wipe out littoral land (or even inland parcels), only to restore
some fraction of it years later. It may well be that, at that latter point
in time, the better solution is for the new littoral owner to extend his
land out to where the previous owners had held title. It is just too
costly to figure out what to do with the original owner when only a
tiny slice of his land resurfaces from the waters. But for these
purposes, these details—on which honest differences of opinion can
arise—do not matter. The two points that do emerge are these: First,
the rules on alluvion and avulsion apply only to natural events, for
there is no mention of any form of human intervention in any of the
68
quoted passages from Gaius or Justinian. The standard modern
definitions of avulsion reflect just that settled understanding: “The
removal of land from one real property and its deposit on the
property of another, by the sudden action of nature (e.g., water or
69
volcano).” Second, somewhat more narrowly, “[a] sudden removal of
70
land caused by change in a river’s course or by flood.” The
restriction to actions by nature is critical because once human
interaction is introduced the question of incentives for good and bad
behavior becomes the linchpin for the overall analysis.
Similarly, the rules in question at no time allow the changes in
natural topography to create a state interest in the land in question.
Rather, at all points the applicable phrase is that the rivers, lakes, and
oceans are publici juris, dealing with the right of the public to access
these waters. The challenge in modern law is to apply this body of law
to those cases in which state action is responsible—whether for good
68. G. INST. 2.66–79; J. INST. 2.2.1–34.
69. Avulsion Definition, DUHAIME.ORG, http://www.duhaime.org (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
70. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 157 (9th ed. 2009).
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reason or bad—for the change in the flow of rivers, lakes, or oceans. It
is just these issues that come into play in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, in which Justice Scalia acutely senses that he is about
to fall off an intellectual cliff. He is dead on the money when he talks
about the role of a doctrine of judicial takings. Once he turns to the
particulars of the case before him, however, he barrels down the
wrong track to a judicial train wreck.
IV. JUDICIAL TAKINGS AND ITS MISAPPLICATION IN STOP THE
BEACH RENOURISHMENT
A. The Takings Clause and Judicial Action
In dealing with Stop the Beach Renourishment, there is much to be
said for Justice Scalia’s initial proposition that the Takings Clause of
71
the Constitution applies to judicial as well as legislative action. He
puts the point well when he writes:
There is no textual justification for saying that the existence or the
scope of a State’s power to expropriate private property without
just compensation varies according to the branch of government
effecting the expropriation. Nor does common sense recommend
such a principle. It would be absurd to allow a State to do by
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by
72
legislative fiat.

In effect, Justice Scalia combines two powerful positions of
73
constitutional interpretation applicable in this case. The first is a
close textual reading, which does not in this instance reference the
source of the taking, but rather uses the passive voice, making it broad
enough to cover all branches of government. The second approach is
more functional: If the legislature and the executive can be stopped,
why not the courts? Judicial decree (with an intended sense of
71. For the earlier articulation of the point, see the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294–98 (1967). For an extended discussion, see Bederman,
supra note 35, at 1436–38. See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV.
1449, 1463 (1990).
72. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601
(2010). I ignore here the extensive dialogue between Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer on
this doctrine, which is analyzed in Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons
from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1203–10
(2009); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1369 (1993).
73. For further development, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO
REVIVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2008).
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arbitrariness) and legislative fiat are cut from the same cloth. That
same approach was taken in connection with the First Amendment
74
guarantee of freedom of speech in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
That case upended huge bodies of the state common law of
defamation on constitutional grounds, even though the First
75
Amendment applies explicitly only to acts of Congress. Yet, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice William J. Brennan, resisted
any invitation to apply it only to state statutes and not to state
76
common-law rules.
Justice Scalia’s position on judicial takings is especially strong in
light of the previous discussion, where it was assumed that the
creation of these rights in the first instance did not follow from any
judicial decision whatsoever, but from the long-standing common
understanding of how alluvial and avulsive changes impacted the
77
riparian or littoral rights. Thus, if the consequences of alluvion were
clear, any judicial decision that altered the initial balance should be
regarded as a taking of private property. At that point the state must
supply compensation unless it can offer some police power
justification for its action. This is indeed the constant theme of the
earlier treatises, which note that while the rights of riparian owners
might be at the “mercy” of the English Parliament, they were strongly
78
protected against expropriation by federal or state action.
The power of vested rights has been recognized with various kinds
of local customs. It should apply with equal force to the universal
rules on alluvion and the like, which had complete traction long
before they were announced or ratified in any judicial opinion. In this
regard, Hawaiian customary law, expertly analyzed by Professor
Bederman, is especially dense and offers a good laboratory to test the
79
general problem of judicial takings. The key point is that this basic
principle works in both directions, such that a claim of private
ownership by occupation should be rejected in the face of a custom
that treats transitional beach land as common property. Bederman

74. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
75. See U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
76. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 265.
77. See supra Part III.
78. See FARNHAM, supra note 45, at 613 (using the term to state that even where property
rights are completely at the “mercy of Parliament, a local body supplying its district with water
has no power other than that given by statute to alter the flow of the water of a stream, although
the alteration causes no sensible damage to riparian proprietors”).
79. Bederman, supra note 35, at 1426–34.
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points first to In re Ashford, in which the littoral owner sought to
register title to the land located between the vegetation line and the
high-water mark—the dry beach, which in Hawaiian goes under the
name “me ke kai.” Yet the tradition on this issue ran clearly in the
opposite direction, so that this effort at private encroachment was
squelched, as it should have been. The universal rule is that private
occupation is not allowed for any form of property that is held in
common, lest the commons disintegrate by noncooperative forms of
individual behavior. At most, there are sensible practices that allow
for temporary use of the beach as a refuge from storm, but none that
81
allow permanent occupation.
By the same token, an aggressive (mis)interpretation of custom
should not be allowed to trump established property rights. The way
in which this transformation can be undertaken is revealed in a
discussion of three cases dealing with a profit à prendre, that is, a right
to gather sticks and other small objects from the land over which
82
another individual holds legal title. As with many local customs, the
peculiarities of geography matter, for a custom like this one could
never develop with respect to lands that did not offer these
opportunities for collection. In dealing with these issues, the
83
84
dimension of the custom is key. In Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., the
court began by noting that “traditional gathering rights do not accrue
to persons, such as the Plaintiff, who do not live within the ahupuaa in
85
which such rights are sought to be asserted.” From this it was an easy
leap to the proposition that these individuals, at the least, could not
use their claims to the custom to block any development that a
86
landowner might otherwise make of his property. The people who
benefited were those individuals who lived in a given ahupuaa, which
is a portion of the island that is defined by the valley that starts at the
top of the mountain and works itself down to the seashore.
As stated in this fashion, the local custom seems to coexist with
the general common-law system of property rights, which was

80. In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968), discussed in Bederman, supra note 35, at 1428.
81. See J. INST. 2.1.5, (the correct translation of the Latin is “hut,” not “cottage”).
82. See Bederman, supra note 35, at 1417–25.
83. For the basic discussion, see Bederman, supra note 35, at 1426–35, from which this
narrative is drawn.
84. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982).
85. Id. at 752.
86. Id.
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incorporated explicitly into the Hawaiian Constitution of 1892. Put
in this form, the reconciliation makes good sense. These ahupuaas are
of exceptional importance in Hawaiian water law. Water coming down
mountainsides does not easily lend itself to distribution under a
riparian system, as there are no rivers with banks. These ahupuaas
define the class of individuals who are eligible to use that water, which
is essential to avoid the risks of overconsumption that are always
88
posed by any scarce resource. In effect, the localization of the
custom prevents an excessive surcharge on the common resource, in
much the way that limiting the right to withdraw water from the river
is limited to riparians for riparian use only.
By the same token, the rule has the right relationship between the
profit à prendre and development rights. When land is in its idle state,
the right to collect twigs and branches is of little or no inconvenience
to anyone, so the custom grew up to exploit that possible source of
gain. The genius of the custom is that it is never generates permanent
title by prescription so that landowners are not put in the position of
having to take unnecessary steps to exclude others when such actions
are both expensive and counterproductive. This situation is not
unprecedented in the law, for the strategy of allowing the use right
while tolling the statute of limitations parallels the legal treatment to
the coming of the nuisance doctrine at common law. In that setting, a
person whose property is next to vacant land can make extensive use
of his own property until the neighbor chooses to build, at which time
89
the statute of limitations starts to run. That configuration of rights
accomplishes two objectives. First, it allows the maximum extraction
of value from both parcels of land combined. Second, it prevents the
statute of limitations from running until an actual conflict emerges,
thereby reducing the possibilities of litigation. For courts to switch the
rule around in the Hawaiian context is a great mistake. It takes the
trivial rights of gathering that were traditionally subordinate to
development and turns them into superior rights that may now be
87. See 1892 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 57, 5 (codified as amended at HAW. REV. STAT. (1994))
(“The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared
to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by
Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian national usage.”).
88. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985). This decision inserted state
ownership where it was not needed. Id. at 1475. This decision, however, has not been generally
approved. See Bederman, supra note 35, at 1438.
89. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD (1998).
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used to block development projects of vastly greater value. This
approach gives any landowner a strong incentive to block the
development of any custom at all. In contrast, the rule that allows
members of the larger community a set of “fill in” rights, lasting until
development starts, permits an interim use to add value to the land in
ways that do not prejudice the long-term position of the landowner.
The older custom is therefore efficient in the way that newly
articulated judge-made rule is not. To be sure, it is always possible for
any developer to try to buy back rights to development. Yet, given the
inchoate group that possesses these rights, the ability to buy back the
rights, in the context of a holdout, is a slim possibility.
The original sensible treatment in Kalipi was undercut in Pele
90
Defense Fund v. Paty. There the court refused to limit gathering
rights to those within the ahupuaa because the claimants introduced
affidavit evidence indicating that these gathering rights extended to
others on the island. The evidence used was far weaker than what
would be needed to satisfy Blackstone’s exacting standard for proving
91
a local custom. The much more dramatic switch took place in Public
Access Shoreline Hawaii [PASH] v. Hawai’i County Planning
92
Commission, insofar as it inverted the relationship between the local
custom and the common-law development rights by treating the
profit à prendre (often held by a broad and diffuse group of
93
individuals) as sufficient to block future development. At this point
it is difficult to disagree with the assessment of Bederman when he
writes:
It is one thing (as has already been suggested) to use custom in a
parcel-by-parcel examination of community rights and interests. It
is quite another to use custom as a means of rewriting the
jurisdiction’s general property law, and, with one stroke of the
judicial brush, to declare public easements in the entirety of the
94
state’s beaches.

It is, of course, not likely that any state court that has introduced
such mayhem with development rights will invalidate its own judicial

90. Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992).
91. Id. at 1222.
92. Public Access Shoreline Haw. [PASH] v. Haw. Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246
(Haw. 1995), criticized in Bederman, supra note 35, at 1431–35.
93. See PASH at 1272 (“Thus, to the extent feasible, we hold that the HPC must protect
the reasonable exercise of customary or traditional rights that are established by PASH on
remand.”).
94. Bederman, supra note 35, at 1441.
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decision on constitutional grounds. Certainly, the federal courts
cannot review a state-law decision on state-law constitutional
grounds, but it makes good sense with respect to these general rights
to treat judicial nullification of established customs as a taking under
state law, which is subject to federal reexamination, just as Justice
95
Scalia held in Stop the Beach Renourishment. That point is especially
true in connection with the ius naturale where there are no local
uncertainties that interfere with the understanding of the underlying
rights. There are a number of judicial decisions and articles that take
96
this position. The question is whether it was applied correctly to the
Florida situation in Stop the Beach Renourishment. The answer to that
question is unfortunately not, as the next section explains.
B. The Misunderstanding of Judicial Takings in Stop the Beach
Renourishment
However strong Justice Scalia’s decision is on the grand question
of judicial takings, it misfires in understanding how the argument
should proceed in the context of this particular case. His decision
starts with the view that it is the holdings of earlier Florida decisions
that establish the background norm against which the claim of a
97
judicial taking must be made. Justice Scalia’s point reflected the way
in which the case had evolved in the Florida courts. The State had
argued that there could be no judicial takings because under Florida
law, the littoral owner did not enjoy any protected access to the water
in the first place, so that there was nothing left to take. In dealing with
this challenge, Justice Scalia makes no mention of the ius naturale in
relation to these cases. Nor does he make any effort to ask whether
the Florida decisions he examines are sound. The only question that
he brings himself to address is whether these earlier cases—none of
which are discussed in the proceedings below—gave the State a leg up
98
in dealing with this question.
Right off the bat, it is clear that he misapprehends how these rules
on littoral rights should work. After his long discussion on judicial
takings, he continues as follows:

95. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2609–
10 (2010).
96. See Somin, supra note 3.
97. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611–12.
98. Id.
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Two core principles of Florida property law intersect in this case.
First, the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to littoral
property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not
interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral
landowners. . . . Second, if an avulsion exposes land seaward of
littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land
belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s
contact with the water. . . . The issue here is whether there is an
exception to this rule when the State is the cause of the avulsion.
Prior law suggests there is not. In Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112
So. 274 (1927), the Florida Supreme Court held that when the
State drained water from a lakebed belonging to the State, causing
land that was formerly below the mean high-water line to become
dry land, that land continued to belong to the State. . . .
Thus, Florida law as it stood before the decision below [in this
case] allowed the State to fill in its own seabed, and the resulting
sudden exposure of previously submerged land was treated like an
99
avulsion for purposes of ownership.

It is instructive to compare this outlook to the treatment of the
100
same subject under the ius naturale. Martin v. Busch is the only case
that need be examined to illustrate the legal chasm. Martin does not
explain why the state should have ownership of the land it drained. If
the earlier conceptions of natural law applied, that land would be a
101
res nullius or owned by the owner of the littoral lands, thereby
avoiding the risk that the state could profit handsomely from its own
conduct. The critical question, however, is whether the draining of the
lake should be regarded as a taking of the property rights of the
littoral owner. In order to answer that question, the proper approach
is to put the matter this way: Suppose that the drainage in question
had been worked by a private party to the detriment of the owner of
the littoral land, whose property values were diminished by virtue of
the loss of view on the one hand and access to the lake on the other. It
is perfectly clear that anyone who dams up a river so that it does not
flow by the property of a lower riparian has committed a major tort in
every jurisdiction that deals with the subject. By the same token, it is
hard to see how the littoral owners on a lake would have no ability to
enjoin that kind of action when done by a private party, especially one
who intends to occupy the land for his own use and benefit.
99. Id. at 2611 (citations omitted).
100. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927).
101. See G. INST. 2.72.
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The question then is: What difference does it make that the state
does the taking? In this context, we do not have to trouble ourselves
with the difference between cases that involve beaches and those that
only involve land that is far removed. In each case, the only difference
between the state and the ordinary private party is that the former
cannot be enjoined while the latter can, so long as the taking is for a
102
public use. The point of this test is to prevent the kind of dangerous
political arbitrage whereby those individuals who would have to buy
rights in the private context now expend energies before legislatures
and planning bodies to obtain political cover that allows them to
103
acquire these rights for nothing at all. In this situation, it would be
odd to say that the regulation in question is needed to prevent some
abuse by the littoral landowners. It is not as though they have
committed any form of common-law nuisance that their neighbors
could have enjoined by right. Put bluntly, it is a case in which the state
has no credible police power justification for its action.
At this stage in the argument, one can concede that emptying a
lake counts as a public purpose, under any test one prepares to
announce. The only question, therefore, is whether there is a duty to
pay compensation. The reason for the just compensation requirement
of the Takings Clause is to make sure that the coercive power of the
state, which cannot be enjoined, is only used to transfer property from
104
Forcing the state to supply
lower to higher-valued uses.
compensation is the only possible way to rein in the political factions
that would otherwise consume legislative and administrative
branches. In some instances, it is possible to find that general statutes
of uniform application create a form of in-kind compensation that
dispenses with the need for cash payments between the parties. Thus,
in the case of reciprocal easements that, on net, benefit each person
subject to the general ordinance, the right way to think about the
problem is to treat the loss of the right to build (say to the edge of a
lot line) as the taking of property for which full compensation is
rendered by the imposition of a like restriction on a neighbor. There is
no need to belabor the intricacies of that formulation here. It is
sufficient to note that none of the littoral owners in Martin received
any sort of benefit from the draining of the lake that offset their loss

102. See TAKINGS, supra note 23, at 332–33.
103. For an expanded account of this theme, see Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra
note 8.
104. See EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT, supra note 73, at 89–93.
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105

of traditional littoral rights. The decision therefore represents a
howling intellectual blunder that is wholly inconsistent with the
general pro-property rights vision that rests with the ius naturale. Why
this decision should be regarded as the baseline against which the
claim is measured is an unexplained mystery. Recall that Justice Scalia
106
did say that “judicial decrees” were no better than “legislative fiat.”
If there was ever a case that was a sheer judicial decree in need of
constitutional amputation, Martin is it.
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia shrinks away from applying that coup
de grace. At one point, he invokes his own oft-quoted statement from
107
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council that government action
depriving a property owner of all “economically beneficial use of his
land” is not a taking if the restriction “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property
108
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” But he never
closes the loop to note that whatever one wants to say about Martin, it
does not reach that status. There is no legal support, even in the
misguided Martin decision, to support the view that the drainage of an
inland lake should be regarded as an avulsion for which no
compensation was in fact awarded. He is in fact queasy about that
conclusion when he writes:
The result under Florida law may seem counterintuitive. After all,
the Members’ property has been deprived of its character (and
value) as oceanfront property by the State’s artificial creation of
an avulsion. State-created avulsions ought to be treated differently
from other avulsions insofar as the property right to accretion is
concerned. But nothing in prior Florida law makes such a
distinction, and Martin suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the
109
contrary.

“Counterintuitive!?” A better word is horrendous. Justice Scalia’s
reading of Martin violates every known reading of the ius naturale
against which it should be tested. It makes far more sense in this
context to knock out a malign state-court decision than it does to
follow it slavishly, even though it is bankrupt on the very points that
105. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927).
106. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2601 (“It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause
forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”).
107. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
108. Id. at 1029.
109. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612.
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are at issue. The matter here is not one of those fine points on which
learned judges could differ in their opinion. It is just a howling
mistake that Justice Scalia follows.
How, then, should he have proceeded? The sensible way is to see
whether Stop the Beach Renourishment can be distinguished from the
earlier decision in Martin. That exercise requires that the Supreme
Court spend less time on the abstract question of whether there can
be a judicial taking and more time looking at the statute itself. In this
case, moreover, the differences matter. Justice Scalia held that this
particular “avulsion” should be treated like a natural event, even
though government agents engineered it from top to bottom. It is
instructive that even Martin did not contain the word avulsion in its
decisions. The consequence was that the state owned the land outright
and in fee simple. By the logic in question, there would be nothing
wrong with the state, in its role as owner of private property, deciding
to exclude all others, including the former littoral owners, from the
property and from building a wonderful high rise that would block
the view of those same littoral owners. After all, if no property rights
are taken, the state can act just like any other property owner.
It is worth noting that the Florida legislature did not entertain
such grotesque ambitions for its scheme. To Justice Scalia, it could not
matter at all that the statute took explicit steps to preserve rights of
both access and view over the land that was subject to the state’s
intervention in the case. The reason his approach is wrong, though, is
that these both matter a lot. Recall that compensation for a statutory
110
scheme could come in cash or in kind. In this case, the limitations
that the state imposed on itself offer huge in-kind benefits to the
former littoral owners who are now guaranteed the two key incidents
111
of ownership normally associated with littoral land. The key
question, therefore, is the extent to which these furnish the needed inkind benefits. In principle, it looks as though access and view from a
distance are not as valuable as those benefits one had as a littoral
owner. The picture is incomplete, however, because the creation of the
erosion line offers a protection to littoral owners that may well tip the
balance in favor of just compensation. Furthermore, the littoral owner
loses any rights to expansion of his or her land that come with
alluvion.

110. See EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT, supra note 73, at 49–50.
111. 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246, amended by, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.45 (2007).
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In deciding whether any landowner is hurt by this statutory
intervention, four factors have to be put into the mix: (1) the loss of
accretion, which has to be set against (2) the protection of land on the
landward side of the barricade, (3) the preservation of easement of
access, and (4) that of the easement of view. The appropriate
disposition of the case, therefore, is to remand to the lower court to
see how the four factors net out. On remand, the obvious difficulty is
that all these owners may not be similarly situated so that some
individuals are left better off than others. The best way to deal with
that complication is to start with a typical landowner and see which
way the balance cuts. Thereafter, each individual landowner could
introduce evidence to indicate that his position is worse or more
vulnerable than those of his neighbors. The State could introduce
evidence on the other side. My own guess is that the State will fare
fairly well under this calculation, which shows ironically that a careful
combination of the right definition of property rights with the correct
eminent-domain analysis can lead you to the right place.
V. JUDICIAL TAKINGS WRIT LARGE
Thus far I have argued that the application of the doctrine to
judicial takings should curb actions such as those taken by the Florida
Supreme Court in cases like Martin v. Busch. One serious objection to
adopting a doctrine of judicial takings is that it might lead to the
unfortunate state of affairs where every switch in state common-law
112
rules could lead to a federal constitutional challenge. To be sure, the
possibility of that extravagant reading cannot be dismissed on a priori
grounds. But, by the same token, it is important to stress just how
narrow a rule is needed in order to pick off cases like Martin without
granting federal courts the position of a council of revision on steroids
over state laws.
Ironically, the best way to understand the appropriate balance is
to generalize from the distinction between alluvion and avulsion. The
Supreme Court should only intervene in those cases that look like
avulsions—radical deviations from established practice that are made
without rhyme or reason. In this case, the transformation was
complete. The standard rules of avulsion never allowed for man-made
113
changes. The moral hazard from such a rule was too great. That
112. See, e.g., Dogan & Young, supra note 4.
113. See supra notes 68, 69, and accompanying text.
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certainly applies in Martin, where state intervention resulted in giving
the state uncontrolled fee ownership of the lakebed. The striking
feature about the case was that it equated a situation where there was
no moral hazard—avulsion—with those cases where the risk of moral
hazard is greatest—deliberate state action from which the
government profits and littoral owners lose.
This last observation offers some clue as to how best to attack the
question of judicial takings. Begin with those cases where the risks of
misbehavior are greatest. That approach is taken with respect to
political action, and one line of cases where that is undoubtedly true
involves the situation where the government has an interest in the
outcome of the case. Nearly 50 years ago, Professor Joseph Sax faced
just this question in seeking to work out what he thought to be
appropriate limits for the takings doctrine by asking such questions as
whether the abolition of the privity rule in product liability cases, or
the defense of charitable immunity more generally, should count as
114
takings. From his perspective, the correct answer to both these
queries is sharply in the negative because he thinks that the critical
distinction in this area is that between arbitral and entrepreneurial
rules:
The rule proposed here is that when economic loss is incurred as a
result of government enhancement of its resource position in its
enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required;
it is that result which is to be characterized as a taking. But losses,
however severe, incurred as a consequence of government acting
merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non115
compensable exercise of the police power.

It is worth examining both the uses and limitations of this
distinction. On one side, it makes sense to cast a suspicious eye on
government activities that enhance the government’s position, as took
116
place in Martin. Here, the case falls securely on the less problematic
side of the line and compensation could be paid to those parties hurt
by this particular rule, given that in each case the dollars owed are
triggered not just by the passage of legislation, but by the concrete
decision to drain a particular site. The difficulties, however, emerge on
the other side. The traditional accounts of the police power did not
114. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 51 (1964).
115. Id. at 63.
116. See Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927) (where the state is awarded ownership of
the land it has drained).
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extend to any and all efforts in which the government sought to
adjudicate disputes between private parties. Rather, it extended only
to those cases in which the government sought by appropriate means
to advance the “health, safety, morals, or general welfare,” of the
population, which is far narrower, but which receives no mention in
117
the Sax account.
The consequences of this distinction are substantial. Using this
118
definition of police power, decisions like Lochner v. New York
suddenly become credible when it can be shown that the decision to
impose a ten-hour maximum work-day statute was intended to
benefit unionized bakers at the expense of their non-union opponents.
At this point, the statute was declared an illegal labor statute and
struck down accordingly. Now let us suppose, as I believe, that the
earlier decision in Lochner was far sounder than the subsequent
judicial decisions that spelled its demise. The next question is: Should
the United States Supreme Court act differently on this matter if the
ten-hour work day was declared to be state policy by a judicial
decision that equally upset the ordinary common-law rules on
freedom of contract? I see no reason to accept the distinction. To
writers like Professor Sax, the point hardly matters because they
would never allow a legislature to strike down this sort of law. But if
the freedom of contract is allowed to regain its status as a real
constitutional principle, the issue of judicial takings has to be faced. In
this regard, moreover, it is instructive to note that both the abolition
of the privity rule and of charitable immunity are suspect precisely
because in each case the rule was applied in such a fashion that
119
blocked any effort to contract away from the rule. That issue is one
that far transcends this discussion, but suffice it to say that if the
legislative version of the action passes constitutional muster, then the
judicial version passes muster as well. The modern rational basis test
as it applies to a wide range of property and contract regulations does
not raise this question today.

117. See Sax, supra note 114.
118. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
119. For products liability, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J.
1960) (blocking the use of disclaimers as unconscionable in implied warranty actions brought by
nonpurchasers of the product), and President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J.). I explore the boundaries between tort and contract on these
questions in Richard A. Epstein, Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in
Context, Article 6, 3 J. TORT LAW (2010) (defending charitable immunity in consensual, but not
in stranger, cases).
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Yet, in principle, surely it should. To return to Sax’s formulation, it
is always risky to use the pronoun “its” as a way to describe
120
government action. As a brute fact of nature, all actual decisions are
made by either individuals or groups of individuals. There is therefore
a real risk that one side in any partisan battle can seize the power of
the state and turn it to its end. Thus, the situation in cases like Stop the
Beach Renourishment would hardly improve if the lakebed were
given to some designated private developer once the water was
removed from it. It is therefore incumbent as a matter of first
principle to look at the major forms of redistribution that judicial
decisions can work between private parties. At this juncture, the old
line between alluvion and avulsion helps show the way. If the
doctrinal changes introduced by judicial decisions are incremental
and do not unfairly favor one class of actors over another, they should
normally be allowed to pass. Thus, a change in the parol evidence rule
to allow in more or less evidence does not put the judicial thumb on
the side of either landlords or tenants. The rule may be wise or foolish,
but the sensible response is to let it pass because there is no obvious
tilt in its application. Indeed, from the ex ante perspective, there is
reason to hope that the new change leaves all parties better off.
In those cases where there is an abrupt change that works in one
direction, however, a much closer level of scrutiny ought to apply. This
should be the case, for example, when a well-established statute of
limitations opened up in ways that benefit only one side, which was
the case with respect to those many statutes that lift the protection of
the statute of limitations on lapsed cases in such hot-button areas as
121
criminal prosecution of child abuse. The same logic should apply to
lifting the statute of limitation by legislation for civil actions brought
by private parties. I see no reason why that result should differ if the
state court decided to lift the statute of limitations of its own motion.
So understood, it seems that the proper scope of the judicial takings
doctrine is dependent on the ability to mirror the decisions used to
evaluate legislative or executive decisions achieving the same end. In
both contexts, every effort should be made to avoid interfering on
small adjustments that have no clear distributional consequences. It is
120. For an illustration of the dangers, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988), where customary tribal claims over public lands were dismissed
on the ground that the government could do what it wanted with “what is, after all, its land.”
121. See, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632–33 (2003) (striking down by a five-tofour vote under the Ex Post Facto Clause to the United States Constitution a state statute that
removed the protection of the statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions of child abuse).
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not, in my view, sufficient to invoke the doctrine of judicial takings to
show that the case law on a difficult point such as the scope of the fair
use privilege in copyright should trigger the application of this
doctrine, if only because there is no secure natural law basis that
undergirds the creation of that elusive privilege. What is really
needed, therefore, is a massive affront to established doctrine of the
sort found in Stop the Beach Renourishment.
VI. WHY THE BREAKDOWN OF PROPERTY RIGHTS?
At this point, the question arises: How it is possible to get such
poorly reasoned decisions like Stop the Beach Renourishment in the
Supreme Court? In this instance, it is hard to attribute the serious
mistakes in the case to any ideological division. Even if the usual
conservative/liberal split arises on the question of whether judicial
takings are cognizable in federal court under the Takings Clause,
there is nothing about the outcome or analysis of the case that shows
Justice Scalia to be an ardent defender of the property rights to which,
in the end, he attaches no real weight. In this instance, I think that
there are two chronic modern mistakes that lead to the result. First,
the Supreme Court has an unnecessary level of nominalism in dealing
with the definition and enforcement of property rights. Second, the
Court has no real appreciation of how a systematic theory of takings
works except in the most simple of contexts. I have discussed this
122
issue exhaustively elsewhere, and thus will only hit the high points
here.
To see why, it is instructive to discuss for a moment two cases that
Justice Scalia cited without discussion for the apparently innocent
proposition that “state law defines property interests, including
123
property rights in navigable waters and the lands underneath them.”
The two cases, St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water
124
125
Commissioners and United States v. Cress, in fact, represent quite a
difference in world views. St. Anthony Falls involved two operators of
dams and sluices for the use of the water within a navigable river for
126
their own power plants. The state of Minnesota, by legislation,

122. See Epstein, Playing by Different Rules, supra note 8.
123. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597
(2010) (citations omitted).
124. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm’rs, 168 U.S. 349 (1917).
125. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
126. St. Anthony, 168 U.S. at 353.
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authorized another company to divert the water from the Mississippi
127
for use in its business, to the detriment of the defendant below. The
United States Supreme Court denied the two plaintiffs any injunctive
relief, holding, in effect, that the state had within its power the ability
to define property rights as it saw fit within a navigable river so that
128
the takings claim was out of place. Under the approach that I
developed in this article, that decision is wrong, given that the
government is not entitled to order, without compensation, any
diversion that a private party could not commit by itself.
Cress involves actions by the federal government and thus
necessarily had to deal with actions that were authorized under the
Commerce Clause with respect to the operation of an interstate
129
river. In dealing with this issue, Justice Mahlon Pitney took the view
that I defend here and refused to allow the recognition of the
navigation easement to snuff out the property rights of ordinary
riparians, whether they are located on a navigable or nonnavigable
130
river. That decision was, for all intents and purposes, overruled in
Justice Robert Jackson’s highly influential but ultimately facile
131
decision in United States v. Willow River Power Co., which was
explicit in its view that the state has untrammeled power to define
property rights in navigable and nonnavigable rivers and thus is
allowed to engage in works on a navigable river that removed from an
upper riparian, in this instance, on a nonnavigable river, the right to its
132
head of water. The decision rested on the key assumption that
property rights were highly malleable. In Justice Jackson’s view, “not
all economic interests are ‘property rights’; only those economic
advantages are ‘rights’ which have the law back of them, and only
when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear
133
from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion.” But
what is needed here is not a stirring declaration of the limits of
private property rights, but a concrete explanation of exactly how to
determine which economic interests are property rights and which are
not, which Justice Jackson never supplied. Needless to say, the ius

127. Id. at 354.
128. Id. at 367.
129. See Cress, 243 U.S. at 319 (where the states’ authority to establish property laws is
subject to Congress’s authority to regulate navigable streams for the purpose of commerce).
130. See id. at 321.
131. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
132. See id. at 511.
133. Id. at 502.
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naturale did not figure in any of these calculations and reflections.
In effect, Willow River rejects the two premises that make Cress
the only intelligent modern decision dealing with navigation
easements. First, Cress refuses to allow either legislatures or states to
just define away property rights that fall comfortably within the
134
existing categories. The contagion quickly spread beyond these
water law cases. It is no coincidence, for example, that Professor Sax,
in dealing with a wide range of government regulations, quoted just
this passage in his effort to insulate all sorts of changes in the law
135
governing private relationships from constitutional oversight. In his
view, the decision stood for the proposition that any “mere
diminution” in value should be the source of compensation from the
136
state. But that is not the point of contention here. In all private
settings the standard rule is that competitive injury is not actionable,
even—make that especially—for “established firms” that are
137
unaccustomed to competition. Nor is it any surprise that Justice
Jackson’s dictum was extended to land-regulation cases. Indeed, in his
ill-conceived decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
138
New York, Justice William Brennan relied on just that decision to
rule that the vested air rights under New York state law did not have
any weight in supporting a requirement of compensation for a
landmark-preservation law that prevented the construction of a tower
139
over Grand Central Station. Does anyone think that a judicial
declaration that it is no longer possible to create or protect air rights
in New York does not count as a judicial taking?
All these cases make a common error. Use of the words “private
property” in the Takings Clause is clear evidence that the Framers did
not regard the institution as subject for degradation by legislation or
judicial administration. They were all firmly in the natural law camp
and none of them, as was common at the time, thought that there was
any deep cleavage between the dictates of natural law and the general
welfare of the public at large. The modern legal realism simply
disregards those conceptions. If, as I have argued here, the institutions
of property that were battered yet again in Stop the Beach
134. Cress, 243 U.S. at 329.
135. See Sax, supra note 114, at 51.
136. Id.
137. For a discussion of how this plays out, see Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State of
Nature Theory, and Environmental Protection, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1 (2008).
138. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978).
139. See id. at 136.
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Renourishment have real firmness and highly desirable social
properties, then the legal nominalism of the United States Supreme
Court comes at a high price. The newly indefinite property rights open
the way to political intrigue that leads to extensive dissipation of
social wealth in pointless factional intrigue. At this point, we can only
wonder: Why does it matter if the Supreme Court labors hard to
establish a doctrine of judicial taking if it mangles its application in
the cases that matter most? It is hard to write intelligently about the
constitutional protection of private property without a deep and
accurate knowledge of the subject—an expertise that is not in great
supply in the United States Supreme Court.

